Capability Risk Report
Tekever AR3 — ISR Mission
01 Programme Posture
High-level sovereignty exposure across the programme. Scores run 1 (sovereign) to 5 (non-sovereign). A higher score indicates greater dependency on non-sovereign sources.
Programme Sovereignty
Average exposure across all dependencies · 1 = sovereign · 5 = non-sovereign
02 Mission Readiness Impact
Sovereignty exposure mapped to each mission activity. Cells show the average sovereignty score for components used in that activity. Red cells indicate mission steps most vulnerable to sovereignty disruption.
| # | Mission Activity | Design | Build | Support | Source | Worst |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Mission Operator receives the tasking | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 2 | The Mission Operator creates the mission plan on ATLAS to take the vehicle to the Start Point (SP) | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 3 | The Launch Operator prepares the AR-3 at the launch site | — | — | — | — | — |
| 4 | The Mission Operator launches the AR-3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 5 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of telemetry systems | 2.0 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| 6 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of navigation systems | 2.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| 7 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of mission systems | 2.0 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 4.0 |
| 8 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of communications systems | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 |
| 9 | The AR-3 sends a confirmation signal to the GCS | 2.0 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| 10 | The AR-3 navigates to its SP | 2.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| 11 | The Mission Operator contacts the ISR Tactical Controller (ITC) to begin the mission | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 12 | The ITC provides requirements to the Mission operator | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 13 | The Mission Operator operates the collection system to provide the video feed to the ITC | 2.0 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| 14 | The Mission Operator informs the ITC that the task is complete and the AR-3 is to be recovered. | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 15 | The Mission Operator instructs the AR-3 to recover | 2.0 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| 16 | The AR-3 returns to the launch site and auto-lands | 2.0 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| 17 | The Maintainer conducts post-flight checks on the AR-3 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 18 | The Maintainer refuels the AR-3 ready for the next mission. | — | — | — | — | — |
03 Critical Vulnerabilities
The ten components with the highest sovereignty exposure, ranked by worst dimension score. These are the primary drivers of programme risk.
| Component | RAG | Design | Build | Support | Source | Notes | Acts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HerePro GPS | 2.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | Manufactured in Taiwan | 2 | |
| Cube ID_CAN | 2.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | Manufactured in Taiwan | 2 | |
| Lidar | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | The LW20/C LiDAR is manufactured by LightWare Optoelectronics (Pty) Ltd., a company based in South Africa, which operates ISO 9001:2015-certified manufacturing facilities there. | 1 | |
| HereLink | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | Manufactured in China | 1 | |
| CUBE Autopilot | 2.0 | 4.6 | 2.1 | 4.6 | Manufacturing is done by American and Allied owned Factories in California and Taiwan | 8 | |
| Communications | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | Most of the systems are built in the US with a couple of exceptions: Doodle Labs, (USA/Singapore) Microhard, (Canada) Persistent Systems, (USA) Radionor, (Norway) Silvus, (CA, USA) TrellisWare, (CA, USA) | 3 | |
| EO/IR Sensor | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | Most of the systems are built in the US with a couple of exceptions: Hood Technology, (Oregon, USA) NextVision, (Israel) Octopus, (Oregon, USA) Tekever, (Portugal) Trillium (Oregon, USA) | 2 | |
| Telemetary Tx/Rx | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1 | ||
| ATLAS | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 9 | ||
| GCS Communicaitons | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 5 |
04 Geographic Concentration
Source countries ranked by risk. Concentration in high-risk geographies amplifies sovereignty risk through geopolitical, logistical, and regulatory exposure.