Capability Risk Report
Tekever AR3 — ISR Mission
01 Programme Posture
High-level sovereignty exposure across the programme. Scores run 1 (sovereign) to 5 (non-sovereign). A higher score indicates greater dependency on non-sovereign sources.
Programme Sovereignty
Average exposure across all dependencies · 1 = sovereign · 5 = non-sovereign
02 Mission Readiness Impact
Sovereignty exposure mapped to each mission activity. Cells show the average sovereignty score for components used in that activity. Red cells indicate mission steps most vulnerable to sovereignty disruption.
| # | Mission Activity | Design | Build | Support | Source | Worst |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Mission Operator receives the tasking | — | — | — | — | — |
| 2 | The Mission Operator receives the tasking | — | — | — | — | — |
| 3 | The Mission Operator receives the tasking | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 4 | The Mission Operator creates the mission plan to take the vehicle to the Start Point (SP) | — | — | — | — | — |
| 5 | The Mission Operator creates the mission plan on ATLAS, including relay orbit point and supported unit frequencies | — | — | — | — | — |
| 6 | The Mission Operator creates the mission plan on ATLAS to take the vehicle to the Start Point (SP) | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 7 | The launch operator prepares the AR-3 at the launch site and loads the BriteStorm system | — | — | — | — | — |
| 8 | The Mission Operator configures the Net Rider Payload with designated frequencies and encryption parameters | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 9 | The Mission Operator launches the AR-3 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 10 | The Launch Operator prepares the AR-3 at the launch site | — | — | — | — | — |
| 11 | The Launch Operator prepares the AR-3 at the launch site | — | — | — | — | — |
| 12 | The Mission Operator launches the AR-3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 13 | The Mission Operator launches the AR-3 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 14 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of telemetry systems | — | — | — | — | — |
| 15 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of telemetry systems | 2.0 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| 16 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of navigation systems | — | — | — | — | — |
| 17 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of telemetry systems | — | — | — | — | — |
| 18 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of mission systems | — | — | — | — | — |
| 19 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of navigation systems | 2.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| 20 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of navigation systems | — | — | — | — | — |
| 21 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of mission systems | 2.0 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 4.0 |
| 22 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of communications systems | — | — | — | — | — |
| 23 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of mission systems | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 24 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of communications systems | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 |
| 25 | The AR-3 gets to its Launch Position and completes a self-check of communications systems | — | — | — | — | — |
| 26 | The AR-3 sends a confirmation signal to the GCS | — | — | — | — | — |
| 27 | The AR-3 sends a confirmation signal to the GCS | 2.0 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| 28 | The AR-3 navigates to its SP | — | — | — | — | — |
| 29 | The AR-3 sends a confirmation signal to the GCS | — | — | — | — | — |
| 30 | The AR-3 navigates to its SP | 2.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| 31 | The AR-3 navigates to the designated relay orbit point | — | — | — | — | — |
| 32 | The mission Operator contacts the EW Mission Controller | — | — | — | — | — |
| 33 | The Mission Operator contacts the ISR Tactical Controller (ITC) to begin the mission | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 34 | The Mission Operator contacts the Comms Controller and reports on station at the relay orbit point | — | — | — | — | — |
| 35 | The EW Mission Controller takes control of the AR-3 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 36 | The ITC provides requirements to the Mission operator | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 37 | The EW Mission Controller initiates the search for the targeted radar system | — | — | — | — | — |
| 38 | The Comms Controller requests activation of the Net Rider Payload | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 39 | The Mission Operator operates the collection system to provide the video feed to the ITC | 2.0 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| 40 | The EW Mission Controller identifies the target radar | — | — | — | — | — |
| 41 | The Mission Operator activates the Net Rider Payload and the AR-3 begins retransmitting on designated frequencies | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 42 | The Mission Operator informs the ITC that the task is complete and the AR-3 is to be recovered. | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 43 | The Comms Controller conducts radio checks with supported ground units to confirm the relay link is established | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 44 | The EW Mission Controller selects the desired effect on the target radar | — | — | — | — | — |
| 45 | The Mission Operator instructs the AR-3 to recover | 2.0 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| 46 | The Comms Controller confirms link quality is satisfactory and the relay is operational | — | — | — | — | — |
| 47 | The EW Mission Controller confirms that the payload is emitting | — | — | — | — | — |
| 48 | The AR-3 returns to the launch site and auto-lands | 2.0 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| 49 | The EW Mission Controller confirms with external agencies that the target radar is being affected | — | — | — | — | — |
| 50 | The Mission Operator monitors relay payload status, link signal strength, and aircraft orbit throughout the mission | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 51 | The Comms Controller informs the Mission Operator that the relay task is complete and the AR-3 is to be recovered | — | — | — | — | — |
| 52 | The EW Mission Controller ceases jamming of the target radar | — | — | — | — | — |
| 53 | The Maintainer conducts post-flight checks on the AR-3 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 54 | The Mission Operator deactivates the Net Rider Payload and instructs the AR-3 to recover | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 55 | The EW Mission Controller informs the Mission Operator that the task is complete and the AR-3 is to be recovered | — | — | — | — | — |
| 56 | The Maintainer refuels the AR-3 ready for the next mission. | — | — | — | — | — |
| 57 | The Mission Operator instructs the AR-3 to recover | — | — | — | — | — |
| 58 | The AR-3 returns to the launch site and auto-lands | — | — | — | — | — |
| 59 | The AR-3 returns to the launch site and lands | — | — | — | — | — |
| 60 | The Maintainer conducts post-flight checks on the AR-3 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 61 | The maintainer conducts post-flight checks on the AR-3 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 62 | The Maintainer refuels the AR-3 ready for the next mission | — | — | — | — | — |
| 63 | The Maintainer refuels the AR-3 ready for the next mission | — | — | — | — | — |
03 Critical Vulnerabilities
The ten components with the highest sovereignty exposure, ranked by worst dimension score. These are the primary drivers of programme risk.
| Component | RAG | Design | Build | Support | Source | Notes | Acts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HerePro GPS | 2.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | Manufactured in Taiwan | 3 | |
| HereLink | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | Manufactured in China | 1 | |
| Cube ID_CAN | 2.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | Manufactured in Taiwan | 3 | |
| Lidar | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | The LW20/C LiDAR is manufactured by LightWare Optoelectronics (Pty) Ltd., a company based in South Africa, which operates ISO 9001:2015-certified manufacturing facilities there. | 2 | |
| CUBE Autopilot | 2.0 | 4.6 | 2.1 | 4.6 | Manufacturing is done by American and Allied owned Factories in California and Taiwan | 11 | |
| Communications | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | Most of the systems are built in the US with a couple of exceptions: Doodle Labs, (USA/Singapore) Microhard, (Canada) Persistent Systems, (USA) Radionor, (Norway) Silvus, (CA, USA) TrellisWare, (CA, USA) | 11 | |
| EO/IR Sensor | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | Most of the systems are built in the US with a couple of exceptions: Hood Technology, (Oregon, USA) NextVision, (Israel) Octopus, (Oregon, USA) Tekever, (Portugal) Trillium (Oregon, USA) | 2 | |
| ATLAS | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 12 | ||
| GCS Communications | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 9 | ||
| Net Rider Payload | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 7 |
04 Geographic Concentration
Source countries ranked by risk. Concentration in high-risk geographies amplifies sovereignty risk through geopolitical, logistical, and regulatory exposure.